Pool Party Snapshot Accounting Exploit
An attacker gamed a flaw in Pool Party's snapshot contracts to inflate a recorded position and drain roughly $215,000 from 15 pools on Arbitrum and Base.
- Date
- Victim
- Pool Party
- Status
- Funds Stolen
- Attribution
- 0x2075c17abbd077cf6406736bb7047ed446ab7f8f
On November 13, 2026, Pool Party, a self-custodial protocol that lets users invest in managed AMM liquidity positions, was drained of approximately $215,000 after an attacker exploited a flaw in the snapshot contracts that track each investor's share of a pool.
What happened
Every Pool Party pool is paired with a snapshot contract that records each investor's position and exposes a syncInvestor function. According to the project, the attacker found a way to change their own recorded position so that the snapshot credited them a claim far larger than the assets they had actually contributed. With the inflated balance in place, the attacker deposited just 10 USDC and then withdrew the pool's funds against the fabricated position.
The exploit ran between roughly 01:34 and 03:38 UTC and hit 15 pools in total — 12 on Arbitrum and 3 on Base. Pool Party said its pools on Polygon and Robinhood Chain were not drained. On Base, on-chain receipts show the attacker (0x2075c17abbd077cf6406736bb7047ed446ab7f8f) making repeated 10 USDC deposits and pulling out thousands of USDC per transaction. The exact line of vulnerable code was not published, but the root cause was the same: a snapshot record treated as a withdrawable claim that could grow beyond the investor's real deposit.
Aftermath
- Pool Party deployed a fix across all four chains (Arbitrum, Base, Polygon and Robinhood Chain), reported the incident to law enforcement and the exchanges involved, and credited
pcaversaccioand SEAL 911 for assistance. - The team posted an on-chain white-hat offer — a 10% bounty, no legal action — asking the attacker to return the remaining roughly $193,500. It said the attacker had already begun converting proceeds to Monero (XMR).
- As of the first public write-ups, no full post-mortem or reimbursement plan had been published, and the stolen funds had not been confirmed as recovered.
Why it matters
Pool Party is a small-scale echo of a recurring 2026 failure mode: an off-ledger accounting record that can be edited into a withdrawable balance. It is the same primitive behind Arcus's subaccount-balance inflation and the empty-market share-price math that broke Kava Lend — in each case fabricated bookkeeping, not a stolen key, became the attack surface. The lesson is blunt: any value a contract will pay out must be derived from assets actually held, never from a mutable snapshot that trusts its own prior state.
Sources & on-chain evidence
- [01]dev.tohttps://dev.to/pandasecurity/pool-party-snapshot-exploit-drained-215k-4nl3
- [02]hacked.slowmist.iohttps://hacked.slowmist.io/
- 0xdd45e871bf2930d4d591ae17870e8e76f2180705e9a33577955ab686df62ea71
- 0xead5f18758f7b01cec7fe98f32156c7008ba8de0758bb5b6984d8e14535fc14a