MORE Markets WFLOW Liquidation Exploit
An attacker used flash-loaned e-mode positions and a liquidation flaw to empty MORE Markets' WFLOW reserve on Flow EVM, draining roughly $308,000.
- Date
- Victim
- MORE Markets
- Chain(s)
- Status
- Funds Stolen
- Attribution
- 0xe1eA6F2365215389f9DCd50a51c974313BF6785C
On November 16, 2026, MORE Markets, a lending protocol on Flow EVM, had its WFLOW reserve emptied of roughly $308,000 after an attacker abused flash-loaned "e-mode" positions and a flaw in the protocol's liquidation logic.
What happened
Starting at 17:30 UTC, the attacker (0xe1eA6F2365215389f9DCd50a51c974313BF6785C) deployed a helper contract and used flash loans to open e-mode positions in the ankrFLOW/WFLOW market, then liquidated those same positions. According to Flow's own analysis, the liquidations cleared the collateral without clearing the matching WFLOW debt, leaving unbacked debt the attacker could use to withdraw WFLOW that belonged to other suppliers.
On-chain, the mFlowWFLOW vault's balance fell from 18,629,353 WFLOW to zero between 17:30:15 and 17:41:58 UTC; the attacker's address received 14,089,553 WFLOW across 11 transactions before routing most of it through a Uniswap v3 WFLOW/PYUSD0 pool. Blockaid and DefiLlama both put the loss near $308,000; at the day's opening price of about $0.0174 the drained balance was worth roughly $325,000. Flow stressed the bug was specific to MORE's contract logic, not to Ankr's liquid-staking token, Flow EVM, Cadence or the base protocol.
Aftermath
- MORE's security council paused the protocol, and Ankr paused ankrFLOW as a precaution.
- Flow published a statement saying the impact was limited to WFLOW suppliers in that market and warned users against anyone offering "refunds" or recovery help.
- Some exchanges temporarily paused FLOW deposits and withdrawals. As of the first write-ups, no post-mortem, patch or reimbursement plan had been published and the funds remained unrecovered.
Why it matters
This was MORE Markets' second WFLOW reserve drain of 2026, after a larger August incident tied to Ankr liquid-staking collateral — the same market, broken a different way. The November bug is a pure liquidation-accounting failure: when closing a position fails to retire the debt it was meant to cover, the shortfall is quietly paid out of other users' deposits. It rhymes with Kava Lend's empty-market share math and ACryptoS's mispriced-deposit drain — in each case fabricated bookkeeping, not a stolen key, became the attack surface. Lending protocols must ensure that every liquidation path conserves the debt it settles, or the reserve becomes a free withdrawal for anyone who can engineer the mismatch.
Sources & on-chain evidence
- [01]dev.tohttps://dev.to/pandasecurity/more-markets-exploit-liquidation-bug-drains-308k-2hf8
- [02]hacked.slowmist.iohttps://hacked.slowmist.io/